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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Evaluating Sex Classifications: The Search for Standards
The latest Supreme Court ruling on legislation mandating disparate treat-
ment based on sex has left lower courts facing challenges to such laws as
unsure of their analyses as they are confident of their results. Six state and
federal district court opinions' handed down within a few months of Fron-
tiero v. Richardson2 reflect both a new judicial propensity for invalidating
legislative classifications based on sex and an uncertainty, expressed or im-
plied, about the proper legal framework in which to do so.
Unquestionably, Frontiero rejected a legislative sex classification as vio-
lative of equal protection.3 But the standard for future analysis of such
classifications remains unsettled, since the justices failed to agree either to
apply one of the traditional equal protection tests or to specify a new one.
Not surprisingly, the succeeding cases combine elements of several different
equal protection rationales. Although the holdings in these cases are simi-
lar, consistency in the future requires a Supreme Court formulation clearer
than Frontiero's.
In that case, plaintiff, a female Air Force lieutenant, was required by
federal law to establish that she was the actual source of more than half
of her husband's support in order to qualify for dependents' benefits for him,
whereas similarly situated male officers automatically qualified for such
1. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 94
S. Ct. 838 (1973); Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973), cert. granted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3457 (Feb. 19, 1974); State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78
(1973); Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School System, 6 E.P.D. 8727 (N.D.
Miss. 1973); Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973); Healy v. Edwards,
363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3458 (Feb. 19, 1974).
2. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Although the Court recently invalidated public school
policies mandating unpaid leave for teachers after the third or fourth month of preg-
nancy, it did not analyze the regulation as one which created a sex classification. Cleve-
land Board of Education v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974). Cf. Justice Powell's con-
currence at 802-04.
3. 411 U.S. at 690.
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benefits for their spouses. 4  When Lt. Frontiero was unable to offer the
requisite proof, she and her husband brought suit in a three-judge federal
district court under 28 U.S.C. section 1331; they sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief, and an award of back pay for the dependency allowance for
medical and dental care and for quarters. They alleged that the disparate
treatment of male versus female officers represented a violation of plaintiffs'
rights under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 5
Frontiero's significance lies in the Court's equal protection analysis of the
challenged regulations. The district court refused to find that the sex classi-
fications of the statutes in question rendered them unconstitutional,6 but the
Supreme Court reversed, requiring that the fringe benefits be extended to
female officers on the same basis as male officers:
We . . . conclude that, by according differential treatment to male
and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose
of achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statutes
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as
they require a female member to prove the dependency of her hus-
band. 7
Although eight justices subscribed to that judgment, there were three sep-
arate rationales for it, and no one of them was supported by a majority
of the Court. Four justices subscribed to the "plurality" opinion declaring
sex to be a suspect classification; Justice Stewart agreed that the statutes
resulted in an "invidious discrimination" on the basis of sex; and three other
justices concurred on the basis of a 1971 Supreme Court decision.8 Pre-
dictably, subsequent decisions in the lower courts attest to the difficulty of
interpreting this case.
Three of these decisions-Ballard v. Laird,9 Andrews v. Drew Municipal
Separate School System, 10 and State v. Chambers'"-relied on the Fron-
4. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 203-4 (M.D. Ala. 1972). See also 10
U.S.C. § 1072(2) (1970) (dependency requirements for increased medical and dental
care); 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (dependency requirements for increased quarters allot-
ments).
5. 341 F. Supp. at 203. Although the fourteenth amendment applies only to state
governments, the Court has interpreted the due process clause of the fifth amendment
to make the federal government responsive to equal protection guarantees. 411 U.S.
at 680 n.5; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
6. 341 F. Supp. at 203.
7. 411 U.S. at 690.
8. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter
in Frontiero.
9. 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3457 (Feb. 19,
1974).
10. 6 E.P.D. 8727 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (invalidating policy of Mississippi school dis-
trict barring parents of illegitimate children from employment.
11. 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973).
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tiero plurality's determination that "classifications based on sex, like classi-
fications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently sus-
pect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.' 2  The im-
pact of this conclusion is perhaps best understood by contrasting the effect
of a "strict judicial scrutiny" standard with the effect of the "rational basis"
standard more typically applied to legislative classifications under tradi-
tional equal protection analysis. Classically, the Court has approached the
examination of laws designating different treatment for different groups of
people with a presumption that such categorizations are valid.13 The chal-
lenged legislation has generally been measured against a "rational basis"
test, to determine whether or not the questioned legislation is rationally
related to a legitimate (i.e., non-discriminatory) governmental objective.
Application of this test requires a court first to ascertain the purpose of the
statutory provision, next to find that purpose permissible in itself, and fi-
nally to discern a sufficient relationship between the legislative purpose and
the classification. In practice, legislative classifications subjected to such a
test have rarely been overturned; a benefit-of-the-doubt approach has regu-
larly resulted in a finding that the "most probable purpose" of a challenged
statute is a "permissible" one.14 Likewise, courts have usually held that
this legislative goal is sufficiently related to the challenged classification to
sustain the statute.
Consequently, equal protection challenges to sexually discriminatory laws
have failed, almost without exception, under this standard.' 5 Moreover,
12. 411 U.S. at 688. See Note, Sex Discrimination by Federal Government in Pay-
ment of Fringe Benefits to Armed Services Personnel, 87 HARV. L. REV. 116, 121
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination]. Three additional post-Frontiero
cases are discussed infra in text. Two other recent cases rejected challenges to sex
classifications by distinguishing their own fact situations from Frontiero's. Magill v.
Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1973), held that the
refusal to permit a female to play little league baseball was not a denial of equal pro-
tection because no state action was involved. In dicta, the court stated that Frontiero
did not apply to contact sports. Id. at 1216-17. Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583
(1973) upheld a law denying a right to partition to a tenant by the entirety by finding
that the law did not contain the sex classification alleged.
13. The rational basis test is alternatively characterized as "permissive review," "re-
strained review," or "minimal scrutiny." See Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HAtv. L. REv. 1065, 1077, 1087-1129 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments]; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
14. See Developments, note 13 supra at 1078, and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464(1948). Recently, however, commentators have discerned a "mounting discontent"
with this deferential equal protection analysis and have postulated an "overarching
inquiry applicable "'all' equal protection cases." Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term. Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Htv. L. REV. 1, 17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
15. See generally Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Ju-
dicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Johnston], for
an extensive survey of a century of cases concerning sex-discriminatory statutes
1974]
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many equal protection challenges to sex classifications involved economic reg-
ulation,' 6 an area in which the courts have been particularly reluctant to over-
turn the legislatures. And with comparable consistency for more than a
century, the effect of applying the rational basis test outside the economic
sphere has been to deny women, and occasionally men, many additional
rights protected for members of the other sex. Such rights include those
of patronizing places of public accommodation,1 7 serving on juries and being
tried by juries of one's peers,18 attending co-educational schools, 19 receiving
equality in criminal sentencing, 20 recovering in actions for loss of con-
sortium,2 ' retaining one's surname on a state driver's license application
after marriage, 22 and being free of university curfew regulations. 23
Continued frustration of their efforts under the rational basis test has led
women's rights advocates to explore alternative theories to achieve their
goals. One strategy has been to appeal for "strict scrutiny" of equal protec-
tion claims, on grounds that legislative classifications based on sex are
regulating many areas of life. See also Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women,
80 YALE L.J. 871, 875-81 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown], providing equal
protection case law support for the proposition that only a constitutional amend-
ment will effectively outlaw discrimination based upon sex. Additional commentary
is found in Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitu-
tional Amendment?, 84 HAv. L. REV. 1499, 1500-06 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Con-
stitutional Amendment] and L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 149-92 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KANOWITZ].
16. As Frontiero itself observed, sex discrimination traditionally has been ration-
alized as "'romantic paternalism,' which, in practical effect, put women not on a ped-
estal, but in a cage." 411 U.S. at 684. Judicially sanctioned economic limitations im-
posed on women, in the name of protectiveness for their presumptively weaker physical
constitutions and emotional sensitivities, provide the most graphic illustration of this
situation. See, e.g., the concurrence of Justice Bradley in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
130, 140-42 (1872) (upholding an Illinois statute denying women the right to practice
law in that state) and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sustaining an Oregon
law which prohibited women from working in excess of ten hours per day).
17. Commonwealth v. Price, 123 Ky. 163, 94 S.W. 32 (1906). But see Seidenberg v.
McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding that tav-
ern's operation involves state action because of tavern's status as a public accomodation
and state's pervasive liquor licensing scheme, and that there is no rational basis for
said tavern's policy of excluding female customers).
18. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). But see Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp.
1110 (E.D. La. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3458 (Feb. 19, 1974), and text dis-
cussion infra.
19. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 951
(1971).
20. State v. Heitman, 105 Kan. 139, 181 P.2d 630 (1919). But see State v. Cham-
bers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973), and text discussion infra. On the history of sex-
ually-disparate sentencing procedures in the United States, see Note, 23 CATH. U.L. REv.
389 (1974) [hereinafter cited as C.U. Note].
21. Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968).
22. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
23. Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 P.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973).
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"suspect. '24 If a court agreed with this reasoning, as the Frontiero plurality
did, it would apply such review to the legislative classification. The strict
scrutiny standard imparts a heavy burden on the government: if the ra-
tional basis test presumed the statute valid, the opposite presumption exists
under strict scrutiny, so that only an "overriding purpose" or "compelling
state interest" can save the classification. Furthermore, strict scrutiny man-
dates a very high degree of relevance of the classification to the state's as-
serted purpose in enacting it. It is not tolerant of classifications which are
over- or under-inclusive of certain individuals relative to the purpose of the
enactment. It does not assume facts and arguments favorable to the legis-
lation and may indeed uphold the law only if there is no "less restrictive al-
ternative" means of accomplishing an acceptable state goal.2 5
24. Synonyms for strict scrutiny include "active review," "rigid scrutiny," and "close
scrutiny." Particularly in the economic area, remedies outside equal protection have
emerged, probably as a response to the growing percentage of women in the labor
force-39.6 as of March, 1971, including 47.6 percent of all single women, 38.8 percent
of all married women, and 65.5 percent of all divorcees. Waldman & Gover, U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Marital and Family Characteristics of the
Labor Force (Special Labor Force Report #144, 1971). Certain mandatory maternity
leave policies for public school teachers, for example, have been found to violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in that they unjustifiably "penalize
the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child." Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791, 800 (1974). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), has been a significant weapon against sex discrimi-
nation through its prohibition of discrimination "with respect to . . . compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... sex .... ." See
411 U.S. at 687. Title VII permits discrimination against members of the indicated
classes only "in those certain instances where . . . sex .. . is a bona fide occupational
qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise." (emphasis added.) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). The so-
called BFOQ burden has been analogized to the compelling state interest test demanded
under strict scrutiny of equal protection cases. On the power of Title VII cases, like
equal protection cases, to affect state laws, see Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444
F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Schaefer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002
(9th Cir. 1972) (instructing private employers to disregard California maximum-hours
limitation for women employees); and Johnston, supra note 15 at 701. The bond be-
tween Title VII and the equal protection clause may well be strengthened by the specific
inclusion, through its 1972 amendments, of "governments, governmental agencies, and
political subdivisions" as "employers" subject to suit for discriminating. Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(2) (1970). Arguably, Ballard
v. Laird and Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School System, discussed infra in
text, could have included Title VII counts. Frontiero itself, if initiated subsequent to
the 1972 amendments, could have been a Title VII case.
25. See generally Developments, supra note 13 at 1087-1127. Moreover, such clas-
sifications must perhaps be "necessary" to achieve a legitimate state purpose. Id. at
1102. Courts will likewise impose strict scrutiny where the legislation affects a "funda-
mental right" of the class which is marked for disparate treatment. See, e.g., Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate termed fundamental). The de-
termination of what is a "fundamental interest" is basically an ad hoc one. Develop-
ments, supra note 13 at 1130. Some scholars are therefore doubtful that it can sys-
tematically advance the economic and social position of women. See Brown, supra
note 15 at 880, 884-85, and Constitutional Amendment, supra note 15 at 1506. There
1974]
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The Supreme Court has been extremely selective, however, about which
classifications it will term "suspect. ' 26 Since the enactment of the four-
teenth amendment in 1868, the classification which has been most vulner-
able to strict scrutiny has been that of race.2 7  Similarly, alienage28 and
national origin2 9 have been denominated suspect classifications. Frontiero's
plurality opinion represents the first Supreme Court statement indicating
that such a designation should apply to sex as well.3 0  Justice Brennan, for
the plurality, based that conclusion on a comparison of the sex characteristic
to the racial one.31 He also acknowledged that the plurality had not been
uninfluenced by various recent congressional actions "manifest[ing] an increas-
ing sensitivity to sex-based classifications '32 which complemented the plu-
rality's view: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,33 the Equal Pay Act of
1963, 3 4 and the proposed Equal Rights Amendment35 were indicated. The
weight which the lower courts attach to this view will, of course, be crucial.
Only rarely has an admittedly suspect legislative classification been up-
held. 36  The position of those posing equal protection challenges to sexually
discriminatory legislation affecting economic, social, educational, and other
areas of life would be substantially strengthened. State legislatures and
may be a relationship between the suspect classification and fundamental right doc-
trines. "As the nature of the classification becomes less invidious . . . the measure
will continue to elicit strict scrutiny only as it affects interests progressively more im-
portant." Developments, supra note 13 at 1120-21.
26. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
27. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and Developments, supra note
13 at 1069.
28. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
29. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
30. Cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding Florida's statute automati-
cally exempting women from jury service).
31. 411 U.S. at 686. Justice Brennan analogized the sex and race characteristics
by reference to the following: long and pervasive history of discrimination, high visi-
bility, immutability, lack of relationship between the characteristic and any ability
of those possessing it to perform in and to benefit society and the consequently
groundless relegation of an entier segment of the population to an inferior legal
status. For two earlier decisions finding sex a suspect classification, see Sail'er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) and U.S. ex rel. Robinson v.
York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968). Although Frontiero never mentions Sail'er
Inn, significant passages in Frontiero are drawn almost verbatim from the California
case. Compare 411 U.S. at 684-87 with 485 P.2d at 540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41.
32. 411 U.S. at 687.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
35. S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 Cong. Rec. 4612 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972);
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971).
The concurrence of Mr. Justice Powell reflects a different view of the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment-i.e., an opportunity offered by Congress for state consideration of
the precise issue which the plurality has undertaken to decide on its own. 411 U.S.
at 692.
36. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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Congress, as well, rather than await lawsuits which would result in the inval-
idation of the restrictive statutes, would probably strike the measures or
amend them so as to extend their benefits to both sexes. In the months
since Frontiero, there appears to have been an about-face from the previ-
ously overwhelming trend of judicial deference to legislative sex classifica-
tion,37 with two federal district courts and a state supreme court agreeing
that sex is a suspect classification.
The "Suspect Classification" Cases
In Ballard v. Laird, a male naval lieutenant challenged the constitutionality
of the statutory procedure mandating his automatic discharge for having
twice failed to achieve the grade of lieutenant commander, although a simi-
larly situated female officer would not have been discharged until she had
served in the Navy for 13 years. 38 The statute affecting Ballard was worded
for applicability to "each officer"; 39 female lieutenants, however, were sub-
ject to a separate provision addressed to "women officers."'40 Like the Su-
preme Court in Frontiero, the Ballard court applied equal protection analy-
sis to the plaintiff's fifth amendment due process claim. Judge East, for the
court, termed Frontiero "controlling" and added:
Whether the discriminatory impact results in favoring the female
rather than the male is no logical differential in the utilization of
the teachings of Frontiero.41
After noting the lack of "any facts asserted by the defendants supporting
a rational basis," 42 the court declared:
[M]oreover, such a test is improperly asserted. For here, we are
faced with an 'inherently suspect' classification, and such classi-
fications 'are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate
that such laws are "necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest." 4s
The court also exhibited the typical impatience of strict scrutiny with any-
thing less than the most serious governmental justifications. Regarding a
37. Compare Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973), decided
two months before Frontiero, with the sex classification cases discussed infra in text.
But see Green v. Waterford of Education, 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973) (pre-Frontiero
invalidation of sex classification).
38. 360 F. Supp. at 643-44. Lt. Ballard had a great financial stake in this action:
accepting the discharge meant severance pay of $15,000, while completing the 13-year
commission would bring $200,000 in benefits.
39. 10 U.S.C. § 6352 (1970).
40. 10 U.S.C. § 6401 (1970).
41. 360 F. Supp. at 647.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 647-48 (citations omitted).
1974]
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purported state interest in administrative efficiency or economy, Judge East
commented:
We assume without deciding that some [state interest] does exist,
nevertheless Reed and Frontiero, each, held that government 'in-
terest of some legitimacy' does not survive a judicial scrutiny and
detection of an invidious discriminatory practice.4"
For a remedy, the court permanently enjoined plaintiff's mandatory dis-
charge and ordered that he be reinstated for purposes of all benefits and
placed on the promotion list at that level to which he would have been as-
signed but for the discharge provision. Without so stating, then, the court
invoked the benefits of the "women officers" provision for Lt. Ballard per-
sonally. Curiously, however, it was that statute, and only that statute, which
the court termed "invidiously discriminatory. ' 45 A general discharge meas-
ure which applied the same terms to both men and women officers would
apparently be acceptable, even if it consisted of the stricter terms previously
applicable only to men. Thus, the court did not find that, in eliminating
distinctions between men and women officers, the terms of the more gener-
ous provisions need be applied. The court left the choice of terms to the
Navy. Of course, the choice could be in favor of the more liberal statute,
so that the 13-year commissioned service discharge standard would apply
to both men and women officers. What is significant about this part of the
Ballard determination, however, is that the question of whether to extend
the benefit in the future has been left to the government. Commentators
who foresaw such situations urged the courts to assume for themselves the
responsibility of extending the benefits to both sexes.40 Frontiero itself had
carefully specified that, since the original purpose of the fringe benefits
offer was to attract career personnel to the armed services, the increased
housing and medical/dental benefits involved in that case were not to be
disturbed, "except insofar as they require a female member to prove the
dependency of her spouse. '47
Arguably, it becomes more difficult for a court to "extend benefits" when,
as in Ballard, two laws form a "statutory scheme" that is unconstitutional. A
court can perhaps cure an isolated statute it finds infirm by striking the word
or words which create the offensive category. If a state liberal arts college
operated under a statute which designated it "a school for men," for ex-
44. Id. at 648.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Kanowitz, supra note 15 at 180-91. Future officers could thus be
discharged after two failures of promotion resulting from sheer "lack of vacancies in
the grade of lieutenant commander", as Lt. Ballard was originally.
47. 411 U.S. at 691 n.25.
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ample, a court finding the law unconstitutional could simply eliminate the
words "for men." In the process of correction, the court also extends the
benefits of attendance to women. In the Ballard situation, however, extend-
ing the benefits of the more generous statute would have been a complex
undertaking. The court would have had to discard the provisions of the
existing statute for "all officers" and substitute those of the women's stat-
ute. But on its face, the existing law for "all officers" contains no sex clas-
sification; only the measure specifying "women officers" is technically un-
constitutional. Thus Ballard indicates that equalizing treatment among the
sexes may not always mean improving treatment for the previously disad-
vantaged sex.
In a second case labeling sex a suspect classification, Andrews v. Drew
Municipal Separate School System, the federal district court granted relief
to two female plaintiffs who were denied employment in the defendant
school district because each was the parent of an illegitimate child. The
court found that the school district's unwritten policy against employing any
person who had an illegitimate child violated equal protection guarantees on
two grounds. First, it found that there was no rational basis for the classi-
fication "employees who are parents of illegitimate children" versus "all
other employees." Alternatively, the court ruled that there was no compel-
ling state interest to support the policy, which both inherently and as applied
constituted an impermissible classification based on sex. 48 For purposes of
the present inquiry, it is the "suspect classification" ground which is of inter-
est. The court specifically defined that classification in Andrews to be
"single women," since in practice a rule requiring the termination of an
employee who had an illegitimate child could not disadvantage a man unless
he knew of and admitted to paternity, while "[a] woman . . . is impreg-
nated, gives birth, and often raises the child alone."'4 9 The court accepted
plaintiff's argument that the rule could not in truth have been aimed at the
"biological fact" of birth, but rather was directed against the practice of pre-
marital coitus. To be constitutional, then, the regulation must be equally
burdensome for male employees who indulge in permarital sex. Since the
disadvantage did not weigh equally on men, the court, citing Frontiero for
strict review, declared the sexual disparity "not constitutionally justified." 50
In response to the defendants' further contention that a woman who en-
48. 6 E.P.D. 8727 at 5220 (N.D. Miss. 1973). This court found it unnecessary
to consider the two plaintiffs' contention that the policy also created an unconstitu-
tional classification based on race, a distinct turnabout from earlier cases where the ra-
cial classification was addressed and the sex discrimination count avoided. Id. at 5218.
See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972).
49. 6 E.P.D. 8727 at 5223.
50. Id.
1974]
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gages in premarital sex, becomes pregnant, and bears an illegitimate child
voluntarily places herself in a classification in which she is not similarly situ-
ated relative to men and is thus justifiably treated differently from men, the
court analogized from Frontiero:
Voluntariness of a classification is certainly not an issue. In Fron-
tiero, more burdensome treatment of a married woman officer in
the armed services, although it was no doubt her voluntary choice
to take connubial vows, was not tolerated.5'
Imposing the traditional "heavy burden of justification" on defendants for
having adopted a suspect classification, the Andrews court demanded a
showing that the purpose of the regulation was "constitutionally permissible
and substantial" and that the use of the classification in question was "neces-
sary to the accomplishment of its purpose. ' 52 The burden, of course, was
not carried.
The constitutionality of New Jersey's indeterminate sentencing procedures
for women, in contrast to the minimum-maximum sentences given male of-
fenders in the state prison, were considered by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in State v. Chambers. The court at the outset reviewed the disparity
in treatment of male versus female offenders, and isolated three funda-
mental factors. First, the sentences of male offenders were fixed by the
presiding judges and the maximum could be less than the statutory maxi-
mum. Women offenders, however, unless convicted of murder or man-
slaughter, had to be given an indeterminate sentence set at the statutory
maximum for the particular crime and unalterable by the judge. Second, the
minimum-maximum sentences for males could be reduced for "continuous
orderly deportment," but there was no comparable provision applicable to
women, except those convicted of murder or manslaughter. Third, male
inmates were eligible for parole consideration after completing a certain
portion of their sentences; no similar provision existed for female offenders. 53
Justice Sullivan, for the majority, determined that both the disparate sen-
tencing and the lack of "good time" credits denied women offenders equal
protection of the laws. The effect of the judgment was to extend to female
offenders the same sentencing procedures applied to male offenders. In
51. id. at 5224. Nor did the Supreme Court evaluate the "voluntary" nature of preg-
nancy when it invalidated certain mandatory maternity leave policies on due process
grounds. Cleveland Board of Education, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974). The question of
whether bearing an illegitimate child is "voluntary" is in any case a debatable one. An
unmarried woman can certainly become pregnant against her will; and prior to the Roe
v. Wade decision, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it would have been extremely difficult for
her to terminate that pregnancy.
52. 6 E.P.D. 8727 at 5224. See also note 25 supra.
53. 63 N.J. at 292, 307 A.2d at 80.
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addition, every female currently incarcerated was to be notified of her right
to immediate re-sentencing to a minimum-maximum fixed term comparable
to what she would have originally received had she been a man.
The court invoked "close judicial scrutiny" of the legislative classification
and affirmed that "certain classifications by their very nature are inher-
ently suspect."'54  The court did not, however, specifically state that sex
classifications fell into the "inherently suspect" category, nor did it cite
Frontiero for that proposition. Instead, Chambers set forth a "suspect clas-
sification" doctrine which triggered the strict scrutiny standard for deter-
mining "whether a fundamental right is being impaired." It is unclear
whether or not the court was thereby intending to state that both a "suspect
classification" and a "fundamental right" must be found before a court can
invalidate a classification under strict scrutiny. The United States Supreme
Court, however, has frequently articulated the test for strict scrutiny-i.e.,
that a finding of either a suspect classification or a fundamental interest will
generate such scrutiny, and that only a finding of compelling state interest
will justify a classification subjected to such scrutiny. 55
Thus, none of the three decisions really demonstrates a firm reliance on
Frontiero's plurality opinion. The Chambers court apparently lacked suffi-
cient confidence in that opinion to state its holding precisely in terms of the
unconstitutionality of the suspect classification within New Jersey's sentenc-
ing scheme. Andrews invoked the "sex-as-a-suspect-classification" doctrine
only for its alternative holding. The bulk of that decision attacked the
larger classification, "employee parents of illegitimate children," and dis-
sected the school board's defenses of its policy using the rational basis ap-
proach. Ballard, seemingly the boldest in its acceptance of the plurality's
suspect classification doctrine, also found support in an earlier, more re-
strained sex discrimination case, Reed v. Reed.56
Reed and "Rationality Scrutiny"
In Reed, a unanimous Supreme Court found that an Idaho probate statute
giving automatic preference to males for appointment as administrators
of decedents' estates violated the 'equal protection clause. The Court there
asserted that it was testing "whether a difference in the sex of competing
applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship"57 to a
state objective that is sought to be advanced. No suspect classification was
54. 63 N.J. at 295, 301, 307 A.2d at 82, 84.
55. See generally Developments, supra note 13; note 25 supra; Gunther, note 14
supra at 9 n.36; and C.U. Note, note 20 supra.
56. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
57. 404 U.S. at 76.
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specifically found, nor was strict scrutiny explicitly invoked. However, the
Ballard case cited Reed for the proposition that the sexually discriminatory
discharge statutes represented an "arbitrary legislative choice . . . incon-
sistent with the command of the equal protection clause." 8 If Reed is not
a "strict scrutiny" case, it seems different, nevertheless, from the traditional
rational basis cases. As the Frontiero plurality observed, Reed does not fit
the requirement of the rational basis test that "a legislative classification
must be maintained unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest."50  The Supreme Court
in Reed admitted that the claimed objective of the challenged Idaho statute
-i.e., reducing the workload of the probate courts-was "not without some
legitimacy." 60 A purpose with "some legitimacy" would ordinarily satisfy
rational basis requisites for sustaining a legislative sex classification which
furthered that purpose. Moreover, a court using the rational basis test would
willingly strain to identify a legitimate purpose in an effort to uphold the
classification. 61
Because of these considerations, Reed's posture as an equal protection
case has been variously interpreted. If the plurality saw Reed as foreshad-
owing their own finding that sex is a suspect classification, the concurring
justices apparently read the earlier case differently. Justices Powell, Burger,
and Blackmun definitively rejected the suspect classification rationale, but
cited Reed as the proper basis for resolving Frontiero.62 They declined to
advance any particular theory of Reed, however.
In an effort to fill that vacuum, three federal district courts implemented
a kind of intermediate equal protection analysis for sex-based legislative
classifications after Frontiero. In so doing, they relied in part on the con-
struct of Professor Gerald Gunther in a leading commentary on the equal
protection cases emerging from the 1971 Supreme Court term.68 According
to Professor Gunther, the Supreme Court in Reed and other recent equal
protection cases may have been seeking "to blur the distinctions between
strict and minimal scrutiny precedents by formulating an overarching in-
quiry applicable to 'all' equal protection cases."'6 4 In this view, all legis-
58. Id. at 75-76.
59. 411 U.S. at 683 (emphasis added). Cf. Cleveland Board of Education v.
La Fleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974), decided on due process grounds, in which Justice
Stewart for the Court noted that "public school maternity leave rules . . . must
not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon [child-bearing]." Id. at 796.
60. 404 U. S. at 76.
61. See Developments, supra note 13 at 1077.
62. 411 U.S. at 691-92 (concurring opinion).
63. See Gunther, note 14 supra.
64. Id. at 17.
[Vol. 23:599
Evaluating Sex Classifications
lative classifications, including those based on sex, would have to withstand
what has been termed "rationality scrutiny" in order to survive court action.6 5
Under traditional equal protection analysis, the invocation of the strict
scrutiny standard signaled invalidation of the statute, while the rational basis
test just as predictably forecast non-intervention. By contrast, rationality
scrutiny would be applied on a case-by-case basis; the outcome would not
flow inexorably from the very invocation of that standard.66 Courts em-
ploying rationality scrutiny would not automatically defer to most conceiv-
able legislative purposes or to imaginable facts justifying statutory classifi-
cations, as was done under the rational basis test. Nor would the courts
so readily tolerate classifications which affect a larger group of people than
necessary for the achievement of the legislative goal (so-called "over-inclu-
siveness") or a group too small to attain the goal (so-called "under-inclu-
siveness"). Over- and under-inclusive categories were largely ignored when
the rational basis standard was applied, and legislation was sustained despite
them.67 The distaste for such categories under rationality scrutiny reflects one
aspect of what Professor Guther terms "a constitutional requirement ...
that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends." 68  For ex-
ample, if a state creates a weight-lifting limitation for working women as a
means to its end of increasing job safety, it must establish that the sex classi-
fication does further that goal. Arguably, if there are many women who
can lift more than the statutory maximum, or many men who cannot, then
the classification is either too broad or too narrow to serve the asserted pur-
pose of job safety, and it must be invalidated.
The requirement of a close connection between the ends and means of
legislation has, theoretically, always inhered in the equal protection doctrine.
Under the rational basis test, however, the principle has been only loosely
retained. Rather, the presumption that legislatures act constitutionally has
been so strong that a court was not bound by the usual source materials in
determining what the purpose of a measure was, but could instead imagine
both what the purpose may have been and what evidence might possibly
support that imagined purpose. Rationality scrutiny would examine a legis-
lative classification in terms of a statutory purpose having "substantial basis
in actuality, not merely in conjecture," and would define that purpose ex-
clusively by reference to materials physically presented to the court.69 Pre-
65. Id. at 21. Subsequently, another writer termed this new mode of analysis "strict
rationality." See Sex Discrimination, note 12 supra.
66. Id. at 19.
67. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
68. Gunther, note 13 supra at 20.
69. Id. at 20-21.
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sumably, though, it would agree to assess a legislative classification in terms
of any constitutional purpose duly offered by the state; it would not demand
that the purpose asserted be "compelling," as the strict scrutiny standard
does.
If in fact rationality scrutiny has become a viable judicial tool, its pre-
cise contours are still unknown. In some instances, courts have rejected pur-
poses advanced by the state while disclaiming the use of strict scrutiny.
Furthermore, the degree to which the legislative classification must further
the asserted purpose is not clearly formulated, at least insofar as rationality
scrutiny may have been applied to sex classifications. In Reed, Idaho's
stated goal of probate efficiency would seem to have been sufficiently served
through the legislative sex classification to meet rationality scrutiny requi-
sites. Did the Justices, in rejecting that classification, want proof of a closer
connection? Or was it primarily a case of the Court's dissatisfaction with
the importance of the legislative goal relative to the classification, an ap-
proach more typical of strict scrutiny, as the Frontiero plurality believed?
Professor Gunther's article raises, but does not resolve, these issues.70
To the extent that the rationality scrutiny model incorporates judicial
activism in the social and economic spheres, its use would increase the like-
lihood of prevailing in challenges to legislative sex discrimination over the
likelihood which exists when courts apply the rational basis standard. Per-
haps the most significant limitation of rationality scrutiny as proposed, how-
ever, would be its emphasis on the means of accomplishing a legislative pur-
pose, to the exclusion of any significant attention to the purpose itself. As
has been indicated, strict scrutiny requires a state to show that it has insti-
tuted a classification only because the purpose of the measure is a "compel-
ling" one, but such a showing would not be necessary under rationality scru-
tiny. Moreover, the rationality scrutiny standard would not mandate that
the means selected-e.g., a sex classification-be the "least restrictive" or
the "only" means possible for accomplishing the legislative goal. Such a
constraint has often been articulated as an element of strict scrutiny, how-
70. Id. at 33-34, 35-37. As in Reed, the Court in Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974), found that the state had proffered two "legiti-
mate" objectives to justify its mandatory maternity leave policies for school teach-
ers: continuity of instruction and elimination of teachers who are physically in-
capable of performing their jobs. Employing due process, rather than equal protection,
analysis, the Court found that the first goal bore "no rational relationship" to the pol-
icy. The Court was willing to assume that the policy did serve the second goal, at
least with respect to some teachers, but found that the "conclusive presumption" of
incapacity nevertheless violated due process. Id. at 796-99. An attempt to find a
parallel equal protection analysis for this case would thus appear to remove it from
a pure "rational basis" category and to give it, like Reed, characteristics of both
"strict scrutiny" and "rationality scrutiny."
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ever. In child custody situations, for example, rationality scrutiny might be
fulfilled when the state goal is found to be protection of minors and the state
court practice is to indulge in the presumption that mothers are to be pre-
ferred over fathers. Under strict scrutiny, however, the state might have to
show that the sex classification inherent in the practice was the least restric-
tive, or even the only, means by which the state's purpose could be served.
Theoretically, then, a court employing rationality scrutiny, unlike one using
the "rational basis" test, would examine carefully the relationship between
a challenged legislative classification-though not "suspect"-and the pur-
pose which that classification putatively serves. The court, however, would
not impose requirements so rigid as those invoked under strict scrutiny; it
would sustain a statute so long as it found that the classification served a
valid goal and that goal has been duly proffered in court by the state.71
Rationality Scrutiny Applied
While the rationality scrutiny model has not yet solidified and no Supreme
Court case or commentary squarely indicates that the standard applies to
sex classifications, three federal district courts have nevertheless included
it in their post-Frontiero analyses of such classifications. Aiello v. Han-
sen,72 Bowen v. Hackett,73 and Healy v. Edwards,74 admittedly hesitant to
rely on Frontiero's strict scrutiny formulation because it was not endorsed by a
majority of the Court, have instead combined rationality scrutiny theory with
language from both Reed and Frontiero.
Scarcely three weeks after Frontiero was decided, a California federal
court ruled unconstitutional the state's insurance code provision which
exempted from coverage all pregnancy-related work loss until 28 days fol-
lowing termination of pregnancy.7 5 Judge Zirpoli for the Aiello Court as-
sumed without discussion that a legislative classification based on pregnancy,
as a "sex-linked characteristic," is a sex classification. Presumably, the
fact that pregnancy affects only women was enough to convince the court
that differential treatment based on that condition constitutes categorization
by sex. Not all courts have agreed.76 Turning to Reed and Frontiero, Judge
71. Gunther, note 13 supra at 21. See also Sex Discrimination, note 12 supra at
124 and n.48.
72. 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 94 S. Ct. 838 (1973).
73. 361 F. Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973).
74. 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3458 (Feb. 19,
1974).
75. 359 F. Supp. at 801.
76. The Supreme Court did not find a sex classification in the mandatory pregnancy
leave policies which it recently invalidated on due process grounds. Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974). The position that pregnancy classifica-
tions are not sex classifications is articulated in Cohen v. Chesterfield County School
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Zirpoli commented that "it remains unclear how sex discrimination fits within
equal protection doctrine."'77 The court interpreted Frontiero as an "inten-
tional[ly] restrain[ed]" opinion and observed that "the challenged statute is
invalid even under the Reed test."7 The Aiello court accepted the rationality
scrutiny theory of Reed, rather than the Frontiero plurality's view of that
case, and said, "It appears . . . that Reed is not intended to establish a
special equal protection test for sex discrimination . . . but is probably only
one of several cases that mark a general shift in the rational basis test."'7 9
Appropriately, A iello's explicit holding faults the exclusionary statute for
being based on a classification which does not have a rational and substan-
tial relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 80 Indeed, Aiello represents a
painstaking examination of all of the state's justifications-i.e., that the ex-
clusion of pregnancy-related disabilities keeps the disability insurance pro-
gram solvent; that if pregnancy disabilities were included, women would
receive more than their share of benefits; that inclusion of disability pay-
ments for pregnancy, which is frequently voluntary, might promote abuse of
the program; and that there would be administrative difficulties in deter-
mining whether or not a woman were truly disabled due to pregnancy. In
response to these assertions, the court cited the lack of any proof that the
inclusion of pregnancy disability benefits would destroy the program and the
common misconception on the part of the state that pregnant women in
general are incapacitated for long periods.
Noting the hardship which this stereotype has brought on women, who are
as a result of it often denied both work and unemployment benefits, the court
suggested in dicta that California could put limitations on amounts of dis-
ability claims generally, rather than exclude arbitrarily a whole class be-
cause of speculations about the size of that class's claims. As to the state's
argument on the possibility of abuse due to the voluntary nature of preg-
nancy-related disabilities, the court pointed out that many such disabilities
are not voluntary, as in the case of the named plaintiffs' miscarriage and
tubal ligation, while other conditions which are covered under the program
(e.g., plastic surgery) are voluntary. 81 The court said that the assertion of
Board, 474 F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 94 S. Ct. 791
(1974).
77. 359 F. Supp. at 796.
78. Id.
79. Id. Cf. the late case of Hanson v,. Huff, - Wash. -, 517 P.2d 599 (1974)
(invalidating Washington's statute disqualifying pregnant women from unemployment
insurance benefits and using strict scrutiny standard, on authority of Reed and
Frontiero).
80. Id. at 797.
81. Id. at 800. See note 51 supra.
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administrative complications in ascertaining pregnancy-related disabilities is,
perhaps, fundamentally objectionable in its attempted rejection of hearings
on the merits. In any case, the court noted that the claim could be dis-
missed on the ground that similar medical verification is necessary in con-
nection with any disability currently covered by the plan. The court also
enjoined future refusals to grant pregnancy disability benefits under the pro-
gram and ordered immediate compensation for pregnancy-related disabilities
to the named plaintiffs. Finally, Aiello extended the benefits of the Cali-
fornia Unemployment Insurance program to the class of women previously
excluded by expressly voiding that clause of the Code which had exempted
them.82
The very diligence of the Aiello court's effort to substantiate its invali-
dations of a sex classification testifies to the possible restrictions of judicial
analysis by rationality scrutiny. Had a racial, rather than a sexual, classi-
fication been at issue-such as a limitation on disability benefits for those hav-
ing sickle cell anemia-government arguments of financial savings and pre-
vention of abuses would never have merited the degree of attention afforded
them in Aiello. Because the racial classification is so well established as
"suspect," it is very unlikely that such a measure would ever have passed a
legislature. Under courtroom challenge it would be subjected to strict scru-
tiny, and only the showing of clear governmental "necessity" could save it.
The pregnancy disability exclusion, on the other hand, could arguably have
survived mere rationality scrutiny, had the court found merit in any one of
these contended governmental goals and a substantial relationship between
that goal and the sex classification.
Sexually discriminatory clauses in the Rhode Island unemployment com-
pensation and temporary disability insurance laws were at issue in Bowen v.
Hackett. By operation of these clauses, women applying for dependents'
allowances with their unemployment compensation or temporary disability
insurances were required to establish a "dependency-in-fact" status for their
children to the satisfaction of the agency director. No similar provision
existed for male applicants. 83 In practice, the provision required that those
women investigated prove themselves to be the "total" source of support for
their dependents. As Chief Judge Pettine for the court summarized the
procedure, female applicants were treated differently from male applicants
in three respects: (1) women had to prove dependency where similarly
situated men did not-e.g., women whose children lived with them usually
had to prove dependency but men whose children lived with them did not;
82. 359 F. Supp. at 797-801.
83. 361 F. Supp. at 857-58.
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(2) women had to prove "total" dependency of their children, while men
were required to show, if anything, a "contribution" to support; and (3)
women were denied dependents' allowances through the mere existence of a
court order requiring support payments from a male, regardless of that
male's defiance of the order.8 4
Chief Judge Pettine noted the similarity of Bowen's facts to Frontiero's.
Like Judge Zirpoli in A iello, however, he observed the division in the Fron-
tiero court and concluded, "It is somewhat difficult to surmise what the ap-
propriate standard of review in this case should be." But "[a]t the mini-
mum, it would seem, the state must meet the standard of Reed."85  For
Chief Judge Pettine this meant that the discriminatory statutory scheme must
have been proven reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. In a
footnote the judge commented, though, that Reed's rational basis test ap-
pears to be different from the traditional one: "The exact content of Reed's
rational basis test is uncertain."88 The court quickly dismissed the state's
"administrative convenience" argument, to the effect that a father can nor-
mally be considered the principal source of support for minor children, on
the authority of both Reed and Frontiero.
The court conceded that the second government justification, avoiding
double payments, "may be a legitimate interest but it is not reasonably ac-
complished by these discriminatory means. '" 87 Avoiding double payments
thus seems to have sparked in the Bowen court a response similar to that
of the Supreme Court when it considered the "probate efficiency" goal in
Reed. As in Bowen, Reed's goal was "not without some legitimacy." That
that acknowledgement was not enough for either court to sustain the sex
classification appears to remove both opinions from the rational basis cate-
gory, and arguably from rational scrutiny, as well. Yet each case has stu-
diously avoided the invocation of strict scrutiny. Finally, like Frontiero
and Aiello, the Bowen court found the state's allegations of financial savings
under the existing procedure unproven. Bowen's holding articulates impa-
tience with its own analytical constraints as surely as it demonstrates cer-
tainty about its result:
In short, this Court finds no justification, reasonable, compelling,
or otherwise, for the discrimination against women in the statute
84. Id. at 859. The ex-husbands of plaintiffs Mary Bowen and Sharon Ferri were
both under court orders to contribute to their children's support. Plaintiff Ferri's ex-
husband was more than $1,000 in arrears, and she provided over 50 percent of her
child's support. Id. at 857.
85. Id. at 860-61.
86. Id. at 861 n.6.
87. Id. at 861. See note 70 supra.
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and in defendant's administrative practices as to dependent's al-
lowances.8S
With Frontiero for a model, the court fashioned an extension-of-benefit
remedy, as had been done in Aiello and Chambers. The clauses in each
statute requiring women to prove their children's dependency to the satis-
faction of the agency director were accordingly stricken. s9
In Healy v. Edwards, a Louisiana constitutional provision and the statutes
enacted thereunder exempting women from jury service unless they affirmed
their desire to serve in writing, were held to deny equal protection to that
class of women whose civil suits Were pending in state court.90 The require-
ment that women volunteer for jury service violated equal protection in two
basic ways. First, potential women jurors were selected differently from
similarly situated men, a condition expressive of the thesis that women must
be shielded from jury duty and implying sexual prejudice.91 Second, female
litigants were forced to have their cases decided by disproportionately male
juries, which impinges upon the right to a jury representative of a fair cross-
section of the community.
Selecting its standard of review, Healy reflected that older Supreme Court
cases92 condoning sex classifications in jury selection statutes had been
"eroded by Reed . . . and crevassed by Frontiero. . .. ,,"3 Acknowledging,
however, that Frontiero was not the definitive declaration of sex as a suspect
classification, Judge Rubin for the court deduced from Reed that the mini-
mum constitutional standard must be similar treatment for men and women
"who are similarly situated with respect to the objectives of the legislation.'9 4
Judge Rubin established that males and females were similarly situated rela-
tive to the legislative objective of "selecting juries"95 by reference to Louisi-
ana's ready acceptance for jury service of those women who do volunteer
and by review of the steady advancement of women's position in the eco-
nomic, social, and political world. While acknowledging reliance on Reed,96
88. 361 F. Supp. at 862 (emphasis added).
89. Id. In fact, the challenged language had already been deleted, but plaintiffs
nevertheless went forward, asking a declaratory judgment and retroactive payments.
90. 363 F. Supp. 1110 at 1117.
91. Id. at 1114. But see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) where the Supreme
Court upheld a nearly identical statute, in part because the state could reasonably con-
sider "woman ... as the center of home and family life."
92. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1879). Note that Healy has squarely opposed the 12-year-old Hoyt on the
ground that Frontiero and Reed have effectively, if not explicitly, overruled it. 363
F. Supp. at 1117. The Court's grant of certiorari in the Healy case provides an op-
portunity for that explicit overruling of Hoyt.
93. 363 F. Supp. at 1113 [citations omitted].
94. Id. at 1113-14.
95. Id. at 1114.
96. Id. at 1113.
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Healy makes no explicit claim to the use of rationality scrutiny. And if that
standard requires examination of legislative means for their relatedness to
legislative goals, it is noteworthy that Healy appears not to have analyzed
any rationalizations propounded by the state before invalidating the legisla-
tion. Although it did not explicitly so state, the Healy court, stressing as
it did the importance of representative and impartial juries, would probably
have been disinclined to uphold the challenged sex classification for any-
thing less than a compelling state interest. 7
Conclusion
The study of six recent cases thus discloses a dilemma in the state and lower
federal courts about the status of legislative sex classifications. Ballard and
Andrews purported to subscribe to the Frontiero plurality, finding that sex
classifications are suspect under the equal protection clause but each also
sought support outside that opinion. Chambers too invoked the suspect
classification doctrine, although the case failed to articulate either a positive
reliance on Frontiero or a clear formulation of the standard of review adopted.
Prior to Frontiero, there was speculation about the Reed case as some-
thing of a departure from traditional rational basis analysis-that is, as rep-
resentative of an emerging "rationality scrutiny." The same commentary,
however, indicated that Reed did not quite fit that new projection and that,
in any case, the model itself had not completely evolved. When Frontiero
appeared, it not only failed to announce a definitive position on sex classi-
fications, but also increased the confusion about Reed by presenting in its
plurality and concurring opinions two irreconcilable interpretations of the
latter case. Neither view clearly posited a rationality scrutiny standard, but
two lower court cases, A iello and Bowen, saw that test as the lowest common
denominator by which to evaluate sex classifications in the wake of Fron-
tiero. The Healy case claimed Reed as the source of its review standard,
but neither mentioned nor demonstrated adherence to the rationality scru-
tiny model or to any other known equal protection test.9s In this connection,
it is worth noting that there has been no formal abandonment of the old ra-
tional basis standard. Even now, a court could imitate Aiello, Bowen and
Healy in finding that Reed expresses the proper standard of review for sex
classifications, but then reject any notion of an intermediate standard such
as rationality scrutiny. 99
97. See Sex Discrimination, note 12 supra at 124.
98. See also Murphy v. Murphy, Civil No. 13-75633 (Fulton County, Ga. Super.
Ct., filed Jan. 24, 1974) (alimony statutes invalidated on undifferentiated authority
of Reed and Frontiero).
99. One late case explicitly maintained that the Supreme Court had not foresaken
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It is apparent that a clear statement from the Court as to the proper test
is essential for the avoidance of widely dissimilar results depending on the
forum. It is true that all six cases here reviewed invalidated sex classifica-
tions despite differing rationales. It is also true, though, that without a
more definitive standard, there will be repetitions of the discrepancies seen
among the six cases discussed, with some opinions invoking strict scrutiny,
some rationality scrutiny, and some apparently making ad hoc determina-
tions. This can only lead to inconsistent methodology and results in future
cases. In the child custody hypothetical, a "strict scrutiny" jurisdiction might
invalidate the practice of automatically awarding custody to the woman,
barring any showing that the state was compelled to implement the
sex classification as the only, or certainly the least restrictive, means of as-
suring maximum protection to the child. The rationality scrutiny standard,
on the other hand, could uphold the practice so long as the constitutional
goal was the one actually asserted by the state and the sex classification
substantially served that goal. A jurisdiction which adopted no clear stand-
ard could find that the practice violated the "spirit" of Reed and Frontiero
even if it did substantially further a valid state objective. Alternatively,
that same jurisdiction could uphold the classification by distinguishing the
child custody situation from Reed and Frontiero in reliance on any one of
numerous subjective assessments, such as the "basic" societal relationship of
mother and child. 100 Because the issues involved in challenges to legislative
sex classifications often touch vital constitutional rights, their resolutions
should not differ depending upon the courtroom in which the action is
brought.
The Supreme Court's recent invalidation of public school policies man-
the rational basis test for sex classifications in favor of rationality scrutiny. Rather,
the justices had merely evidenced commitment to the more pragmatic analysis of such
classifications. See Weisenfeld v. Secretary, 367 F. Supp. 981 (1973). Acknowl-
edging that the rational basis test would trigger the opposite result, the Wei-
senjeld court nevertheless found that a federal statute providing Social Security benefits
for widows, but not widowers, violates the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment because it creates a suspect classification based on sex which cannot be
justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 990-91.
100. See the recent case of Arends v. Arends, - Utah 2d -, 517 P.2d 1019 (1974),
in which a father appealed from an award of custody to his ex-wife on the ground
that the statutory presumption favoring mothers violated equal protection. Denying
relief on other grounds, the court commented that the father's contention had no merit
in any case since he "was [not] equally gifted in lactation with the mother." Id. at
1020. Having discarded the equal protection claim, the Court made no reference to
either Frontiero or Reed. In a case decided two days later, however, the same court em-
ployed a "reasonable basis" test to uphold a statute setting the age of majority at 21
for men and 18 for women, citing the "widely accepted" idea that females mature
earlier than males and ignoring Frontiero and Reed. Stanton v. Stanton, - Utah 2d
-, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974).
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dating unpaid leave for teachers after the third or fourth month of preg-
nancy has not obviated the possibility of such diverse results. The determi-
nation in LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education1°' was made on due proc-
ess grounds, with no finding that the policies contained sex classifications.
If the analysis in the case has equal protection parallels, it is unclear whether
"strict scrutiny" or "rationality scrutiny" is the dominant model. 10 2 Having
agreed to review the A iello, Ballard, and Healy cases, the Court may be
preparing to dispel the confusion surrounding sex classifications. A decision
is also pending in Shevin v. Kahn, a case arising before Frontiero, in which
the Florida Supreme Court upheld a statute affording tax exemption to
widows but not widowers. 10 3
Supreme Court action to eliminate rulings on sex classifications by judi-
cial fiat could take any one of several forms. A renewed commitment to
the old rational basis standard is an option, but not a probable one; it would
require a virtual overruling of Frontiero and Reed and a repudiation of
many contemporary legal and societal trends. Alternatively, the Court
could articulate the rationality scrutiny standard and provide the substand-
ards necessary to apply it consistently in challenges to sex classifications.
Inherent in such a test, however, is wide latitude for individual judges to
determine how much of a relationship between legislative means and ends
satisfies equal protection. It is therefore submitted that maximum uniform-
ity of results in this area can be achieved only through a definitive invoca-
tion of the strict scrutiny doctrine. Substantial gains in economic and psy-
chological well-being for both men and women are likely to flow from that
choice.
Marilyn S. Gross
101. 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974).
102. See note 70 supra.
103. Fla., 273 So. 2d 72 (1973), prob. juris. noted, 94 S. Ct. 283 (1973). The
Florida court found that the measure bore a "fair and substantial relation" to the
state purpose of reducing the economic disparity between men and women and therefore
satisfied the requirements of Reed. Id. at 73.
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